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severe income poverty -its global extent, geographical distribution, and trend over time -are widely cited in official publications by governments and international organizations and in popular media, often in support of the view that liberalization and globalization have helped to reduce poverty worldwide. For instance, the former President of the World Bank has declared: "Over the past few years, these better policies have contributed to more rapid growth in developing countries' per capita incomes than at any point since the mid-1970s.
And faster growth has meant poverty reduction: the proportion of people worldwide living in absolute poverty has dropped steadily in recent decades, from 29% in 1990 to a record low of 23% in 1998. After increasing steadily over the past two centuries, since 1980 the total number of people living in poverty worldwide has fallen by an estimated 200 million -even as the world's population grew by 1.6 billion." 3 Most readers, including many economists, take these figures as clear-cut facts. But the method used to calculate them has serious flaws, which render the resulting estimates untrustworthy. First, the international poverty line (IPL) used by the Bank to identify the absolutely poor fails to meet elementary requirements of consistency. It does not have a common interpretation (in terms of purchasing power) across countries and years. As a result, the Bank's poverty line leads to meaningless poverty estimates, as some of those identified as poor have clearly greater command over commodities than some of those identified as non-poor. These inconsistencies are an inherent consequence of the Bank's method and cannot be eliminated without jettisoning the method altogether. Second, the Bank's poverty line is not anchored in any assessment of the basic resource requirements of 3 James D. Wolfensohn: "Responding to the Challenges of Globalization: Remarks to the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Governors," Ottawa, November 17, 2001 . These data appear to be drawn from World Bank 2002, 8. human beings. Third, the poverty estimates currently available are subject to massive uncertainties because of their sensitivity to the values of crucial parameters that are estimated on the basis of limited data or none at all. An alternative method of estimating global poverty is feasible and necessary.
The Bank's Method Produces Meaningless Estimates
In order to estimate global poverty, it is necessary to define a common standard according to which individuals may be identified as poor or non-poor. The Bank proposes its international poverty line (IPL) as such a common standard: People are to be counted as poor if their consumption expenditure has less purchasing power than some baseline level, defined in terms of a certain quantity of the currency of a base country, A, in a chosen base year, V. For example, the IPL employed by the Bank in its first major global poverty estimation exercise was US$1/day PPP 1985. 4 According to this standard, people are to be counted as poor if, and only if, their daily consumption expenditure has less purchasing power than $1 had in the United States in 1985.
To make its IPL applicable to other countries and years, the Bank uses a two-step procedure. First, the Bank undertakes a spatial translation. It uses the purchasing power parity conversion factors (PPPs) of base year V to convert the chosen baseline amount into the national currencies of other countries (B, C, D) . In this way, the Bank determines, for each country, a national poverty line for year V which it deems equivalent to the IPL.
Second, the Bank undertakes a temporal translation of the resulting year-V national poverty lines. Here the Bank calculates national poverty lines for other years (W, X, Y) by inflating or deflating each country's year-V national poverty line according to that country's national consumer price index (CPI). After performing these two operations, the Bank, relying on household income and consumption surveys, identifies the poor in any given year as those living below their country's national poverty line for this year.
Reversing the Bank's two-step procedure, we can think of it as a method for making currency amounts comparable across countries and years. This method allows the Bank to compare a person's income in some country B and year W ("BW amount") with a person's income in some country C and year X ("CX amount"), as follows: The BW amount is converted, via B's CPI, into its BV equivalent and, analogously, the CX amount is converted, via C's CPI, into its CV equivalent. These BV and CV amounts are then further converted, via PPPs of the base year V, into their AV equivalents (A being the base country and V the base year). The resulting AV amounts can then be compared with one another and also with the IPL.
Though apparently straightforward, this method generates significant problems. The main difficulty is that "equivalent" purchasing power is an incomplete concept. The critical missing question is: Equivalent purchasing power over what commodities? PPPs value different currencies (in the base year) according to their purchasing power over a set of commodities which are weighted in proportion to their shares in international consumption expenditure. Each national CPI values a country's currency in each year by assessing its purchasing power over a set of commodities which are weighted in proportion to their shares in that country's consumption expenditure. As shall now be shown, because national consumption patterns differ greatly from one another and from the international consumption pattern, the Bank's purchasing power comparisons are not robust with regard to the base year chosen and the poverty estimates it derives on the basis of these comparisons are therefore meaningless. One may think that the problem of inconsistent ratios can be avoided by using PPPs from a single base year alone, so that only one spatial comparison of purchasing power is ever involved. In fact, this is what the Bank does (within any one application of its method).
This hides the problem, but cannot solve it. For the fact remains that all the results the Bank reaches -about the levels of the national poverty lines as well as about national, regional, and global poverty rates and poverty trends -are greatly influenced by the Bank's arbitrary choice of PPP base year, which is completely irrelevant to anyone's standard of living.
In the following diagrams, each curve represents one country's CPI (denominated in this country's currency), that is, nominal amounts in successive years that are deemed equivalent to one another in purchasing power. Curves rising toward the right reflect currency inflation: Ever more currency units must be earned in successive years for an income to maintain its purchasing power over commodities whose prices are rising.
With one curve, representing changes in the purchasing power of one country's currency only, its vertical position does not matter to identifying the percentage changes in income that are necessary to maintain a fixed level of purchasing power. To represent purchasing power equivalence across different countries, however, the curves corresponding to different countries' currencies must be placed at the correct vertical distance from one another. The Bank uses PPPs to fix such vertical distances. Comparison of the following pair of hypothetical diagrams illustrates how the vertical distance between curves can be affected by the choice of base year (whose PPPs are used to fix this distance). In the illustration, using Y rather than V as the base year has the effect of lowering B's national poverty line relative to A's national poverty line for all years and must therefore either lower B's poverty headcount or raise A's poverty headcount or both. It follows that estimates of how much poverty there is in country A as compared to country B will vary substantially depending on the base year in which the Bank's IPL is defined. Moreover, estimates of poverty for the same year and country vary substantially depending on the base year in which the Bank's IPL is defined. It is easy to see this by thinking of country A in the diagrams below as the base country in the currency of which the IPL is defined.
The poverty estimates that the Bank's method generates when applied with one PPP base year are inconsistent with those it generates when applied with another. This suffices to discredit the method even when it is always applied with the same base year. Even then, it is still true that the estimates generated by the method are improperly influenced by the base year chosen. This dependence of poverty estimates on the PPP base year in terms of which the IPL is anchored goes well beyond the accustomed dependence of economic statistics on the base year in reference to which they are defined. The discrepancies between the estimates yielded by two applications of the Bank's method are so large as to render this method 13 From 30.7% to 29.4% (Ravallion and Chen 1997, Table 5 ). The global poverty headcount index is the number of human beings living below a given IPL divided by the number of persons living in the developing countries. 14 From 28.31% to 28.15% (Chen and Ravallion 2000, widely known as Engel's Law) and the share of services in consumption has increased. As the international consumption pattern shifts in this way, commodities that are very much cheaper in poor than in rich countries are given more and more weight in the calculation of general-consumption PPPs. Using such PPPs to assess the incomes or consumption expenditures of very poor people thus becomes increasingly distorting. The distortion arises from the fact that, no matter how much the share of basic necessities in international consumption may diminish, a poor household must still focus virtually all its expenditure on such necessities. The apparent rise in the reported purchasing power of poor households due to an international consumption shift toward services can mask the fact that such households have not gained greater access to the goods they most require.
To see the potential effect of this distortion, consider a simple hypothetical example: a world with two countries, one poor, the other rich, say India and the US. There are two commodities: food, which is somewhat cheaper (at market exchange rates) in India, and services, which are vastly cheaper (at market exchange rates) in India than in the US.
Assume that two poverty assessments, involving different PPP base years, are undertaken.
In particular, suppose that the IPL has been defined as $1/day in the earlier base year.
Suppose further that rising general affluence has shifted international consumption away from items with higher relative prices in India (food) toward items with lower relative prices in India (services) in the period between the two base years. The calculation of the general-consumption PPP in the later base year will then be more influenced by the prices of services, and less influenced by food prices, than was the calculation of the generalconsumption PPP in the earlier base year. Assuming that all prices in both countries remain constant, the shift in the pattern of international consumption causes the new generalconsumption PPP to be lower than the old (8 rather than 10 Rupees per Dollar, say). How could the IPL be "updated" in this scenario? Maintaining the poverty line at $1.00/day PPP would preserve the US poverty line but lower the Indian poverty line from Rs.10/day to Rs.8/day. Revising to $1.25/day PPP would preserve the Indian poverty line at Rs.10/day but increase the US poverty line by 25%. Any upward revision of the IPL by less than 25% raises the US poverty line and lowers the Indian one. Any such redefinition amounts to telling poor Indians that their opportunity to buy services very cheaply has become more valuable thanks to the increased share of services in international consumption expenditure.
The Indian poor can plausibly reply that the international shift toward consumption of services is quite irrelevant to them, as they are still compelled to concentrate their expenditure on the basic necessities (such as food) they need to survive.
This distortion arising from the Bank's "updating" of its IPL can have the effect of improving the appearance of the long-term global poverty trend. Where trend estimates inappropriately compare poverty headcounts based on distinct IPLs (defined in terms of earlier and later PPP base years) the effect of the distortion is clearly to produce a more favorable estimate of the poverty trend than would otherwise result: As successive IPLs correspond to ever lower Indian national poverty lines, more and more Indians will be counted as non-poor even if all incomes and prices in India remain the same.
Where trend estimates invoke poverty headcounts based on a single IPL, the year in which this IPL is defined influences the estimate of the trend (just as it influences estimates of the extent of global poverty in a given year). Given the biases just described, an IPL defined in terms of a later PPP base year will tend to be associated with lower PPPs (poor-country currency units per US dollar) and hence with lower poor-country poverty lines and lower poor-country poverty headcounts for all years. Price ratios between rich and poor countries vary widely across commodities. For goods easily traded across borders, prices compared at market exchange rates are about the same in rich and poor countries. For goods and services not easily traded across borders, prices compared at market exchange rates can be fifty times higher in rich countries than in poor 22 Cf. text at note 30 below.
23 Chen and Ravallion 2004, 153. 24 World Bank 1999, 25. The word "today" may refer to 1999 rather than to 1998. Still, this minor variation cannot possibly account for the huge discrepancy between this trend estimate, based on the old IPL, and the trend estimate referenced in note 18 above, which is based on the new poverty line. -It should be noted, however, that the conjecture does not hold for 1987-93: For this much shorter period, the trend relative to the new IPL looks worse than the trend relative to the old IPL.
Cf. text at notes 13 and 14 above.
ones. 'Broad-gauge' general-consumption PPPs of the kind used by the Bank average out these price ratios in a way that, roughly speaking, weights each commodity in proportion to its share in international consumption expenditure.
The use of such PPPs is quite inappropriate for poverty assessment and severely distorts the resulting poverty estimates. To illustrate, consider once more our simple two-country world. Suppose, not unrealistically, that $1 buys about three times as much food in the US as Rs.10 buy in India and also that Rs.10 buy about three times as much services in India as Very low incomes should therefore be assessed by relating them not to the prices of all goods and services, but only to the prices of those commodities they must consume to meet their basic needs. This would ensure that the IPL is meaningfully related to the circumstances under which people actually live. Under the Bank's procedure, by contrast, people living at the IPL may differ greatly in their command over basic necessities.
We do not currently possess all of the data needed to estimate poverty worldwide in this more sensible way, although it should be possible in the future to collect it. The data we do have suggest how global poverty estimates would be different if a more credible procedure were used. Existing data about the prices of foodstuffs and, more specifically, of staple bread and cereals, show that these items (a large part of the consumption requirements of the poor) cost far more in poor countries than general-consumption PPPs suggest. The same is true for many basic necessities other than food. 25 It is very likely that the Bank, were it to use PPPs more closely related to the needs of the poor, would translate its $1/day standard into substantially higher national poverty lines for most poor countries.
How much higher would these national poverty lines be? If prices of foods, or more specifically of breads and cereals, rather than prices of all commodities had been used to convert the Bank's existing IPLs, then poor-country poverty lines would likely be some 30-40% higher on average, 26 which would raise the estimated global incidence of severe income poverty substantially. For a small number of countries for which we were able to make estimates, we found that increases in national poverty lines by 30-40% entail increases in poverty headcounts of a similar magnitude. Tables 6A and 6B , giving population-weighted geometric means of this ratio for all poor countries for which data were available. If all-food PPPs are used in lieu of general-consumption PPPs to convert $1 PPP 1985 into national currencies, national poverty lines of poor countries increase by 40% on average. Using bread-and-cereals PPPs to convert $1 PPP 1985, the average increase is 34%. Using all-food PPPs to convert $1.08 PPP 1993, the average increase is 31%. Using bread-and-cereals PPPs to convert $1.08 PPP 1993, the average increase is 40%. 27 Ibid., Table 10 It is obvious that, were the Bank to set its IPL at an appropriately higher level, it would arrive at a much higher global poverty count. It is less obvious, but true, that the Bank 28 USDA 1999, ES-1. Estimates in a similar range are garnered from other available exercises that have sought to establish the least cost of being adequately nourished in the US. In 1963, the USDA estimates that the cost of three minimally adequate meals a day for a typical family of two adults and two children was $2. 736 (1963), or $0.684 (1963) Chen and Ravallion 2004, 153. 31 One important factor is the role of questionable "regression" exercises, which are used to estimate PPPs for countries that did not participate in benchmark price surveys. Although the R 2 in such regressions is often high, the estimates for individual countries are often unstable and subject to considerable fluctuations depending on what specification of the regression equation is used. See Ahmad, S. (1992) for a description. A second important factor is that PPPs are currently generated by linking across regions estimates of the relative price levels of the different countries within each region. This is done through "link countries" that participate in price surveys in more than one region. The choice of link country is likely to have a substantial influence on calculated PPPs. India has not participated in a benchmark survey since 1985. As observers of India are well aware, there are likely to have been significant changes in its internal price structure since then. Consequently, current estimates of India's poverty headcount are subject to substantial uncertainties.
While the Bank reports global poverty counts with five-digit, even six-digit precision, suggesting possible errors of a few thousand at most, the data used in producing these estimates (PPPs in particular) are subject to vast uncertainties. This fact sharply undermines any claim to precision, and should be more fully acknowledged.
In addition to these reasons why the Bank's estimates of the extent of poverty are uncertain, there are additional reasons to believe that poverty trends in particular are uncertain, and that they may currently be represented in an overly favorable manner: When the Bank lacks up-to-date data about the distribution of consumption expenditure in a country, it assumes that the distribution is unchanged. In particular, the Bank assumes that the consumption of all individuals has grown in proportion with the rate of growth of consumption in the national income and product accounts. There are several reasons to doubt the validity of this procedure. First, it is well known that in recent years income inequality has risen in many countries, again including China and India. 33 It may thus be overly optimistic to assume that the consumption of the poor has grown in tandem with mean consumption in their country. Second, as argued powerfully by Deaton (2003) , the measure of consumption in the national income and product accounts is a broad one and is likely to reflect growth in forms of consumption that have little significance for the poor. In a global poverty monitoring exercise, it may be desirable to specify at the global levelthrough a transparent and widely consultative process -not only these income-dependent elementary human capabilities, but also the characteristics of the commodities typically needed to achieve them. For instance, the basic requirement of being adequately nourished can be met by consuming commodities containing calories and essential nutrients. The income persons need to avoid poverty at some particular time and place can then be specified in terms of the least expensive locally available set of commodities containing the relevant characteristics needed to achieve the income-dependent elementary capabilities, while respecting the role of factors beyond the immediate control of persons (such as specificities of culture or natural environment) that ought to be taken into account.
Conclusion: There is a Feasible Alternative
A fixed set of elementary human capabilities can also provide a uniform standard for adjusting national poverty lines over time so as to reflect changing prices of the basic necessities needed to achieve the elementary capabilities. Such adjustments should be made by national committees, acting with the goal of developing national poverty lines that are consistent with the global standard adopted. There will be no need for a definition (let alone periodic redefinitions) of an IPL expressed in monetary terms, if this common standardinvariant across countries and years -is adopted. A uniform standard will allow the world to have confidence that the concept of poverty used in estimating the number of the world's poor means something -and means the same thing regardless of where and when they live.
The advancement of the approach to improving global poverty estimates that we advocate can simultaneously serve (and be served by) a second effort -that of improving poverty estimates at the national level. Our favored approach requires nothing more than the adoption of common methods for setting poverty lines and for generating poverty estimates in countries around the world. The common application of such improved methods can simultaneously strengthen national poverty estimates and make them suitable for comparisons and aggregations. National poverty estimates that can be compared and aggregated can in turn be used to produce regional and global poverty estimates.
It is necessary to strengthen the data and methodology of poverty assessment within countries if more meaningful global poverty estimates are to be created. It is notable that such efforts have been lacking, although they are feasible. An example of what is possible is given by the diffusion throughout the world of a common system of national income and product accounting through the involvement of the United Nations 34 -an achievement once thought highly improbable. Although the development of a credible system of global poverty monitoring will require time and resources, these costs are small compared to the potential costs of continued ignorance. Without an effort to develop such a system, it will be difficult to accept that the agencies charged with monitoring global income poverty are serious about the task.
